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Governments legislate remedies when other segments of 
society fail, or are perceived to fail, to respond to a par 
ticular need. A prime example is in the area of health and 
safety. The belief that there were excessive industrial ac 
cidents was taken as evidence that the private sector was not 
doing enough with health and safety in the work environ 
ment, and remedies were not only insufficient but difficult to 
secure. Throughout the 1970s sensitivity to the suffering 
caused by industrial accidents and the lack of recourse led 
many countries to direct more attention to the problem. In 
New Zealand, this response resulted in the most extensive 
no-fault accident compensation legislation in existence to 
day. All persons who suffer a personal injury by accident are 
compensated, regardless of whether or not the injury is 
employment-related.
Certainly the intent of New Zealand*s legislation is 
laudable, but it is critical to examine the manager's ex-
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perience within such a system because legislation does not 
always result in the intended consequences. For example, 
rather than reducing lost time from industrial accidents, 
comprehensive compensation provisions may, in fact, have 
the opposite effect. Since compensation becomes the acci 
dent victim's entitlement and right, there may be an increase 
in the number of accidents reported and/or the duration of 
time off resulting from an accident. If the legislation results 
in this behavior, the economic burden on the employer is 
greater and this shift may, in turn, cause the employer to 
reduce prevention program initiation and/or compliance. In 
this case, the number of accidents may go up and the out 
come is opposite the original intent of the legislation to 
reduce suffering.
Obviously, employers are a critical link in implementing 
and financing the provisions of health and safety compensa 
tion legislation. Thus, one must determine to what extent 
health and safety legislative provisions influence manage 
ment's perceptions concerning employee behavior and their 
subsequent decisionmaking in the health and safety area. Do 
employers perceive that the provisions facilitate or hinder 
organizational health and safety activities? Do the legislative 
provisions shift a greater economic burden onto the 
employer because employee behavior changes? Are other in 
stitutions or groups more influential than the government in 
the firm's administration of health and safety programs?
The answers to these questions obviously have both 
management and public policy implications. Management's 
response within the context of multiple external pressures 
will affect future legislation as it is modified to achieve the 
intent of the original law and vice versa. Understanding the 
influence exerted by other factors, including other firms, 
unions, employee groups, and other government rules and 
regulations, will also provide insight into the most effective 
implementation approaches. Not only the government but
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the employers themselves may be able to use these groups to 
cooperatively improve health and safety records.
This paper examines employer perceptions and behavior in 
response to New Zealand's comprehensive accident compen 
sation legislation. In the first section the background of the 
Accident Compensation Act is briefly reviewed, followed by 
a discussion of the provisions of the legislation. Provisions 
for levy rates and incentive rebates under the Safety Incen 
tive Scheme are outlined. The second section examines the 
current data on industrial accidents in New Zealand, 
highlighting the data on seven high-risk industries. The third 
section then outlines the methodology used in collecting 
survey data on management's perceptions and responses 
within these high risk industries. The data are reported and, 
finally, conclusions are drawn.
New Zealand's Accident Compensation Act
Prior to the 1972 Accident Compensation Act, New 
Zealand's personal injury remedies under the law were 
fragmented and generally considered insufficient.
• A victim was entitled to a limited form of compensation 
payable under workers' compensation legislation but 
only if the accident or disease arose out of work and in 
the course of employment.
• A victim could claim damages in the Courts if 
negligence on the part of some other person could be 
established.
• A victim could draw on funds administered by the 
Crimes Compensation Tribunal if the injury was caused 
by the criminal acts of others.
• A victim could receive social security 1 if none of the 
above remedies was available.
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• Owners of motor vehicles were required under the 
Motor Vehicle Insurance Act of 1928 to insure against 
death or injury liability (Fahy 1982).
The litigation and inequitable treatment resulting from 
this fault-based approach (i.e., that an action in law for 
damages arising out of personal injury or death could only 
be sustained if negligence on the part of the defendent was 
proven or admitted) ultimately led to a Royal Commission of 
Inquiry on Compensation for Personal Injury in New 
Zealand report in December 1967 (the Woodhouse Report)2 
and passage of the Accident Compensation Act (ACA) in 
1972. The 1972 Act and its Amendments were supplanted by 
the Accident Compensation Act of 1982 which became effec 
tive April 1, 1983. The 1982 Act did not alter the concept of 
the system but rather simplified previous complex wording 
and improved administrative provisions (Fahy 1983).
The Royal Commission set down several principles upon 
which the legislation rests:
• Community responsibility;
• Comprehensive entitlement;
• Complete rehabilitation, which would be encouraged by 
an award not being revisable downward after an initial 
assessment;
• Real compensation (adequate benefits); and
• Administrative efficiency (Royal Commission 1967).
The purpose of the Accident Compensation Act is thus to 
provide accident prevention, compensation, and rehabilita 
tion for every man and woman, and protection 24 hours a 
day. The compensation itself is governed by the personal cir 
cumstances of the accident victim. If there is a loss of earn 
ings or a loss of earning power, the compensation payable
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under the accident compensation scheme is related to that 
loss of earnings and earning power. Rehabilitation assistance 
is also tailored to meet the actual and continuing needs of the 
accident victim, so the nonearner is covered in this way (In- 
glis 1982).
To insure this coverage, three schemes have been im 
plemented: An Earners' Scheme for employed or self- 
employed persons, a Motor Vehicle Scheme for persons in 
jured in accidents involving motor vehicles, and a Sup 
plementary Scheme for persons not covered under the first 
two schemes, including homemakers and visitors to New 
Zealand (Dahl 1976). Broadly, the Earners' Fund and the 
Motor Vehicle Fund are independently financed and self- 
supporting, and each is charged with all amounts paid in 
claims which arise under the respective schemes. 3 The Sup 
plementary Fund is financed from money appropriated for 
that purpose by Parliament.
Employer's Contributions
Since the focus of this paper is on employer costs and fac 
tors influencing their behavior, it is important to examine the 
Earners' Fund, which is financed by levies on employers and 
self-employed persons. Through this fund employers finance 
the earnings-based compensation which is paid to employees 
who suffer an injury, whether or not such injury arises in the 
course of employment. The levy paid by the employer is paid 
at a rate specified for that particular industry activity 
classification or classifications. All industry, trade, business 
and professional activities are classified so that the amount 
of levy collected for each class and the amount of compensa 
tion, medical expenses, and other payments provided can be 
recorded. Work accident accounts are kept by industrial ac 
tivity classification. A separate nonwork accident account is 
kept and the costs (compensation, medical expenses and
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other payments) are spread equally over all industrial ac 
tivities. It should be noted that industrial activity refers to 
the employer, not the occupation of the employee. Thus, the 
nature of the goods produced or services rendered deter 
mines the industrial activity under which the leviable earn 
ings of the employees are classified. The levy rate per $100 of 
wages ranges from $.50 for the provision of actuarial ser 
vices, the practice of accountancy, the services of ad 
ministrative agencies, clerical, management activity, etc. to 
$5.00 for mining underground, exploring, prospecting and 
development works (natural gas, minerals, oil) in, on, or 
above the continental shelf, and tunneling (Accident Com 
pensation Corporation 1983). While higher rates are set for 
more dangerous activities by the ACC Board, there is not a 
strict multiplicative relationship between the degree of 
danger and the levy. In other words, as evidenced in the in 
jury rate (see tables 2 and 3) mining is more than 10 times 
more dangerous than actuarial services. To some extent 
then, "safe" activities subsidize more dangerous activities.
The Accident Compensation Act does fix a maximum 
amount of individual earnings on which the levy is payable. 
The Accident Compensation Order of 1981 (S. 1981/338) 
raised this maximum to $39,0004 applicable to payments due 
May 31, 1983. Prior to this, the maximum amount of in 
dividual earnings on which the levy was payable was 
$18,720. The leviable earnings include wages and salaries, 
overtime pay, holiday pay, piecework payments, long- 
service leave pay, bonuses or gratuities, gross commissions, 
honoraria and allowances for boarding, lodging or housing.
The Earners' Fund gross levy revenue ($149,317,624) 
made up 62 percent of the total income ($242,388,617) 
received by the Accident Compensation Corporation for the 
year ending March 31, 1982. At this time there was a credit 
balance of $218.2 million in the Earners' Fund, but forecasts
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indicated that the fund would be inadequate to meet the long 
term run-off of claims in years ahead. The shortfall was 
$62.7 million (Fahy 1982). The financial implications of this 
for employers may be very serious.
While a financing deficit is projected, it is interesting to 
note, as indicated in table 1, that the number of work acci 
dent claims remained fairly constant from 1975 through 
1981. The proportion of claims on the Earners' Fund for 
nonwork accidents, however, has been steadily increasing, 
from 31 percent in 1975 to 43 percent in 1981.
Table 1 





























SOURCE: ACC Statistics, Wellington, Accident Compensation Corporation Vol. 1, No. 
1, March 1982, p. 12.
NOTE: Not all claims result in compensation being paid—especially those made to protect 
the claimant's entitlement in the future.
In addition to paying levies into the Earners' Fund, an 
employer is also responsible for directly compensating 
employees 100 percent of their earnings on the day of the ac 
cident and during the following six days if the employee is 
unable to work because of an injury arising out of and in the 
course of employment (ACA& 112). Effective April 1,1983, 
the employer's first week compensation liability also in 
cludes any overtime the employee would have worked (Fahy 
1983). In practical terms, this means the employer must pay
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the employee the full amount he/she would have received 
had he/she been working. In 1982 it was reported that the 
cost of this first week's compensation still averaged about 10 
cents per $100 of the leviable payroll (Fahy 1982, p. 32). If 
the earner is incapacitated for more than seven days the 
Commission pays the compensation regardless of whether or 
not the accident arose out of and in the course of 
employment5 (ACA & 113).
Safety Incentive Scheme
The Safety Incentive Scheme rewards those employers 
whose work-related accident records are significantly better 
than other employers paying the same industrial activity 
levy. This is not a no-claims bonus system, but rather is bas 
ed on actual performance relative to expected performance. 
In other words, an employer with a perfect record (no ac 
cidents for which claims are filed in the period) does not 
necessarily receive a bonus. If the employer is engaged in low 
accident activities, no claims would be expected. A signifi 
cant improvement is thus more likely from employers engag 
ed in activities where the accident rate is expected to be high.
In 1982 the ACC paid out 190 Safety Incentive Bonuses 
totaling $1,145,661, based on accident and wages informa 
tion for the period of April 1, 1978 to March 31, 1981. The 
bonuses were calculated at 12.5 percent of the net work levy 
paid for the year ending March 31, 1981.
Accident Rate Data
It is logical to hypothesize that the first week provisions 
and the Safety Incentive Scheme would provide the employer 
with an incentive to actively seek health and safety im 
provements and reduce the accident frequency rate. Unfor 
tunately, it is not possible to make valid comparisons be-
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tween data published preceding and following the passage of 
the Accident Compensation Act. Unlike current provisions, 
claims made under the old Workers' Compensation Act, for 
example, included first-week incapacities but excluded in 
juries to the self-employed (notably farmers). Injuries receiv 
ed traveling to and from work were also not included in 
previous statistics but are now deemed to be 
"work-related." These last two factors are significant con 
tributors to the "fatalities" now recorded. The exclusion of 
the first-week incapacity also means that injury frequency 
and severity statistics are not compiled as in the past (Acci 
dent Compenstion Corporation 1982). As shown in tables 2 
and 3, an "injury rate" is currently calculated based on the 
number of compensated accidents per 1000 workers, which 
does allow comparisons across industries and occupational 
groups, however.
The industry data in table 2 shows that while the injury 
rate averages 35 for all industries, it ranges from 86 for min 
ing and quarrying to 5 for finance, insurance, real estate and 
business services. Manufacturing had the second highest in 
jury rate in 1981, 60, with a total 18,672 compensated ac 
cidents. More than one-third of all compensation paid went 
to manufacturing workers. The highest number of fatalities, 
44, was in forestry and fishing but this industry did not have 
the highest accident rate (compensated claims per 1000 
workers) as previously discussed.
By occupation group, the highest injury rate and number 
of fatalities were recorded for transport equipment operators 
and laborers as shown in table 3. This occupational group 
also received nearly two-thirds of the compensation paid in 
1981, $21.2 million. Forest workers, fishermen and hunters 
had the second highest injury rate, 43, with 45 fatalities. 
Compensation paid to this occupational group totaled only 
$5.1 million, however.
Table 2 
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SOURCE: Derived from Summary Report—Compensated Accidents, 1981, Accident Compensation Corporation, Wellington, New Zealand, 
1982.
•Compensated claims per 1000 of labor force (1981 census).
**Reported in thousands as of May 31, 1982.
Table 3 
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SOURCE: Derived from Summary Report—Compensated Accidents, 1981, Accident Compensation Corporation, Wellington, New Zealand,
1982.
Compensated claims per 1000 of labor force (1981 census).
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Employer Decisionmaking
Given the universal coverage of the Accident Compensa 
tion Act, the levy system, the employer's responsibility for 
compensation during the first week, and the presence of an 
incentive scheme, it is important to examine the employer's 
response to this legislative initiative. Specifically, four ques 
tions need to be addressed:
• To what extent does the availability of accident compen 
sation and government legislation, in general, influence 
management's response to health and safety compared 
to other factors such as the union, other firms, 
employee concerns, and other government rules and 
regulations?
• To what extent do employers believe that the provisions 
of the AC A change employee behavior? That is, does 
the existence of compensation prolong the absence of 
injured workers, or are more accidents reported as a 
result of the compensation?
• To what extent do employers believe that their expen 
ditures in the health and safety area are offset by lower 
accident rates?
• To what extent are the influencing factors and the 
employer's cost benefit assessment correlated with ac 
tual accident behavior in the organization?
The answers to these questions are all related to one 
another. In terms of cost considerations, price competition 
and the employment relationship, the employer is going to be 
influenced by other firms in the industry, government rules 
and regulations (as distinct from compensation provisions), 
unions, and other employee groups. Employee behavior can 
be expected to be influenced by the benefits provided 
through the government's accident compensation legislation.
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This behavior will in turn affect the employment relation 
ship. The interactive relationship between these factors is 
shown in figure 1.
Figure 1
External and Internal Factors
Influencing Employer Perceptions and Behavior










As suggested in the questions above, it is hypothesized that 
factors influencing an employer's reaction do not have a 
direct impact; this influence is instead filtered through the 
employer's overall assessment of the costs and benefits of 











Employer cost benefit analysis moderates the effect of factors influ 
encing employer behavior and resultant accident record.
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With respect to costs, economic theory suggests that 
organizations assume a proprietary strategy and seek to max 
imize their return. This classical assumption about economic 
self-interest does not automatically prescribe a particular 
treatment of health and safety within the organization, 
however. On one hand, the employer driven to minimize 
costs has no incentive to invest in safety programs, machine 
safeguards, new selection procedures, etc. Accident preven 
tion has explicit costs which can be avoided. On the other 
hand, accidents themselves are an expense. Accidents may 
involve disrupted production, damaged equipment, lowered 
morale resulting in overall lower productivity, compensation 
payments, recruiting and selection replacement costs, and 
the payment of wage differentials. The employer may thus 
choose to invest in accident prevention because "the benefits 
derived from the safety expenditure are costs which are not 
incurred" (Berkowitz 1979, p. 53). Certainly some invest 
ment in health and safety is economically rational, and it is 
assumed that these expenditures will have an impact on the 
organization's accident record.
Methodology
In order to assess the impact of New Zealand's accident 
compensation provisions in the context of other factors in 
fluencing an employer's cost benefit assessment and accident 
record, intensive information was collected within seven in 
dustries, including forestry, pulp and paper, construction, 
steel, rubber, oil exploration, and chemicals. The distribu 
tion of firms between industries was balanced, and within 
each industry the number of foreign-owned versus domestic 
firms was also balanced. Data were collected from 19 cor 
porations, as well as from their respective plant operations, 
for a total of 38 organizations. Eighteen of these organiza 
tions were foreign-owned. Six were headquartered in 
Australia, six in Britain, two in the U.S., two in Holland and
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two in Japan. Twenty of the surveyed organizations were 
domestic enterprises.
Two- to three-hour structured interviews were conducted 
with the corporate president or chair of the board and/or the 
senior executive responsible for health and safety within the 
organization. A second copy of the questionnaire was sent to 
the general manager of one of the organization's operating 
facilities. This questionnaire was returned directly to the in 
vestigator. Employers responded to detailed questions on 
organization structure and behavior, and perceptions of fac 
tors influencing health and safety administration. Health 
and safety performance was measured by the level of ac 
cidents. Employer response was measured by the hierarchical 
level of the position of the individual charged with primary 
responsibility for health and safety, and the percent of this 
individual's time spent on health and safety issues. Percep 
tual questions about influential factors, union relations, etc., 
were measured on a 7-point scale.
Results
It has been suggested that multiple factors moderate the 
effect of legislation on management's behavior and their 
perceptions of this effect. Across the industries sampled, 
government rules and regulations and the provisions of acci 
dent compensation legislation were reported as having a very 
high influence on health and safety decisionmaking within 
the firm. The mean influence rating for each of these factors 
was X = 5.21 and X = 3.77, respectively, as shown in table 4. 
Evaluated on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all influenced, 
7 = influenced to a great extent), employers also reported be 
ing influenced by employee concerns and demands (X=4.08) 
and to a slightly lesser extent, the union in the plant 
(X=3.52). Employers did not indicate that employee turn 
over (X=1.79) had an impact on the decisionmaking. The
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impact of other firms in the industry (X = 2.78) was also low. 
This may be explained, however, by the fact that when 
employers were asked to compare themselves with other 
firms in the industry, the mean response was X = 5.49, with 7 
indicating that they believed they placed much more em 
phasis on health and safety than did other firms.
Table 4
Overall Mean Score Evaluation of Factors Influencing 





Employee concerns and demands 4.08
Employee turnover 1.79
Other firms in industry 2.78
Accident compensation 3.77
Government rules and regulations 5.21
An analysis of these influential factors by industry, as 
shown in table 5, revealed that government rules and regula 
tions were most important across all industries. In both rub 
ber and forestry, the accident compensation and the govern 
ment rules and regulations were linked as the top two in 
fluential factors. In the remaining industries, employee con 
cerns and demands constituted the second most important 
factor. The oil and chemical industries indicated that other 
firms in the industry was the third most important factor in 
fluencing their health and safety decisionmaking, while the 
other industries, steel, construction, pulp and paper and rub 
ber, rated the union as being the third most influential factor 
in their respective industries. The mean response in forestry 
indicated that employee concerns and demands was the third 
most important factor in that industry.
Table 5
Extent to Which Factors Influence Health and Safety Decisionmaking 





Other firms in industry
Potential law suits
Accident compensation
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In order to assess the nature of this perceived influence, 
the question was asked whether the influence exerted by 
these factors was positive or negative. In other words, did 
the managers believe that other firms, the union, employees, 
etc., facilitated or hindered their efforts in the area of health 
and safety administration. Certainly it would be possible for 
one of these factors to be exerting a great deal of influence, 
but in a counterproductive fashion. In fact, in no case did 
the 34 employers respond that these factors hindered their 
health and safety efforts. With the exception of the response 
to government rules and regulations (X=5.49), employers 
viewed these factors as fairly neutral, that is, neither 
facilitating nor hindering their health and safety efforts. The 
mean ratings on the other factors were between X = 3.64 for 
employee turnover and X = 4.97 for employee concerns.
Cost-Benefit Assessment
Obviously one or two factors, whether internal or external 
to the organization, will not in and of themselves change an 
employer's behavior with respect to health and safety deci- 
sionmaking. These factors interact with each other and 
organizational factors such as the amount of time spent on 
health and safety and the position level of the individual with 
primary responsibility for health and safety within the 
organization. The employer then considers these aspects and 
screens their impact in the context of the economic return to 
the organization.
As previously discussed, legislation affects not only 
employer compliance behavior but also employee behavior, 
which in turn has an economic impact on the firm. One 
reservation about the accident compensation legislation, for 
example, is the fear that the system will be abused. If 
employees view the provisions as benefits to which they are 
entitled, which in fact they are, more accidents which the
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employee would previously have simply worked through 
may be reported. It is also possible that the employee will be 
absent from work longer with a given accident because he or 
she is receiving compensation. In fact, when the employers 
were asked, "To what extent do you believe that more ac 
cidents are reported as ajesult of accident compensation?," 
the mean response was X = 5.31, with 1 indicating "not at 
all" and 7 indicating "to a great extent." The mean response 
to the question, "To what extent does the existence of acci 
dent compensation prolong the absence of injured workers," 
was also high (X= 5.00).
In order to assess the overall economic impact of accident 
compensation legislation and other influential factors, 
employers were asked "To what extent do you believe that 
your expenditures in the health and safety area are offset by 
your accident rates?" The perception of worker's absence, 
given the presence of a compensation system, was not 
significantly correlated with this overall cost-benefit assess 
ment, but was significantly correlated with beliefs about the 
number of accidents reported. The greater the extent to 
which employers felt more accidents were reported, the less 
likely they felt that their costs in the health and safety area 
were offset by the benefits. As shown in table 6, the overall 
assessments of the influence of accident compensation 
legislation and government rules and regulations were not 
significantly correlated with the employer's cost-benefit 
analysis. Other factors influencing health and safety deci- 
sionmaking which are significantly correlated with the 
employer's cost-benefit assessment include the union and 
employee turnover.
Organizational characteristics which were positively cor 
related with the manager's cost-benefit analysis at a 
significance level less than .05 included the size of the cor 
poration measured in terms of number of full-time
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employees (r= .28 p< .05). If the firm was headquartered in 
New Zealand, the employer was also more likely to feel that 
the costs were offset by the benefits or lower accident rates 
(r=.27p<.05).
Table 6
Correlation Between Factors Influencing Health and Safety 
Decisionmaking and Employer Cost-Benefit Analysis 








Accident compensation -.04 
Government rules and regulations -.01
*p<.10
**p<.05
Influencing Factors, Cost-Benefit Analysis 
and Accident Record
The impact of legislation and other factors is important 
not only in terms of the degree of influence on decisionmak- 
ing and the employer's subjective assessment of the costs and 
benefits. More significant is the relationship between these 
elements and actual accident behavior in the organization. 
Given the number of factors influencing health and safety 
outcomes, is accident compensation correlated with lower 
accident rates, or is the direct effect erased by the economic 
impact of unintended consequences, i.e., more accidents be 
ing reported and longer absences by those who claim com 
pensation?
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Table 7 shows that accident compensation legislation, as a 
factor influencing employer decisionmaking, is positively 
correlated with the accident rate (r= .33 p< .05). This find 
ing may simply reflect the fact that the more accidents in an 
organization, the more likely it will have transactions with 
the Accident Compensation Corporation. The relationship 
between government rules and regulations and the accident 
rate in 1982 was significant and in the expected direction 
(r = -.39 p<.05). The greater the reported influence of the 
government, the lower the accident rate. Another external 
factor significantly correlated with the accident rate was the 
influence of the national union (r = .55 p < .05). The relation 
ship is not in the expected direction. The coefficient indicates 
that the national union influence was stronger in those 
organizations with higher accident rates.
Table 7 
Correlation Between Factors Influencing Employer Health and Safety
Decisionmaking and the Accident Rate in 1982 








Accident compensation .33** 
Government rules and regulations -.39**
Other structural variables:
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As an internal influencing factor, employee turnover 
(r=.29 p<.10) was positively correlated with the accident 
rate in 1982. In other words, the greater the influence of 
employee turnover, the higher was the accident level and vice 
versa. Other organizational structural variables which were 
significantly correlated with the level of accidents in 1982 in 
cluded the locus of ownership and the position level of the 
person given primary responsibility for health and safety. 
The locus of ownership variable revealed that New Zealand 
organizations were more likely than foreign-owned organiza 
tions to have accidents (r = -.34 p<.05). The position level 
of the individual primarily responsible for health and safety 
also indicated that for the organizations sampled, the higher 
this assignment, the higher the number of accidents 
(r = -.25 p<.10).
Conclusion
Accident compensation legislation does not always result 
in intended consequences. Survey research conducted in 38 
organizations shows that the New Zealand Accident Com 
pensation Act is not, in and of itself, perceived as a major in 
fluence on employers' health and safety decisionmaking. 
Government rules and regulations are a major influence, 
however, along with employee concerns and demands and 
the plant union.
The impact of the accident compensation legislation is evi 
dent in employers' assessments of resultant employee 
behavior and their own subsequent cost-benefit analyses of 
health and safety expenditures within the organization. 
Employers reported that they believe more accidents are now 
reported as a result of accident compensation (X = 5.31 on a 
7-point scale) and that the existence of accident compensa 
tion prolongs the absence of injured workers (X = 5.00 on a 
7-point scale). The employer's overall assessment of the costs
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and benefits of health and safety activities within their 
organization was significantly correlated with the employers' 
beliefs about the number of accidents reported, but not with 
the employers' beliefs about extended absences. This finding 
supports the notion that the overall benefits derived from 
comprehensive compensation provisions outweigh the cost. 
Despite the belief that more accidents may be reported, 
employers felt that their expenditures in the health and safety 
area (including the first week compensation requirement) are 
offset by lower accident rates.
Further evidence of the impact of accident compensation 
legislation is found in the significant correlation between the 
influence of this legislation and the level of accidents in the 
firm. Government rules and regulations and national unions 
were also significantly related to the number of accidents 
reported in 1982.
The policy implications of the findings reported here are 
that government agencies and the Accident Compensation 
Corporation may be able to strengthen their influence on 
health and safety in the firm even further, through increased 
cooperation with the unions. The data show that this effort 
would be best directed toward the individual plant union 
organization rather than the national federations. The find 
ings further indicate that efforts to help employers address 
employee concerns should also prove useful. Across all in 
dustries, employers reported a high level of influence exerted 
by perceived employee concerns and demands. An example 
of such an involvement would be facilitating policy formula 
tion, such as the New Zealand Employers Federation policy 
statement on health and safety in the workplace adopted in 
1983 ("NZEF Adopts Policy" 1983).
From the employer's perspective, the finding that the 
stronger the union influence on health and safety decision- 
making the more likely the employer reported that the
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benefits outweighed the costs in health and safety ad 
ministration, suggests that employers may also find it useful 
to strengthen the union's role in this area. A second recom 
mendation, which fits with working more closely with the 
workers, is to place management responsibility for health 
an'i safety administration at lower levels within the organiza 
tion. This suggestion flows from the finding that the higher 
the assignment of responsibility for health and safety within 
the organization, the higher the level of accidents. A third 
recommendation is that employers may find it useful to work 
with other firms on resolving health and safety problems. 
The majority of firms reported that they believed that they 
placed more emphasis on health and safety than did other 
firms. This suggests that organizations may be able to learn 
from one another. The unions may also be able to provide a 
mechanism for this linkage.
NOTES
1. Under Part 1 of the Social Security Act of 1964, injured persons able 
to qualify under the relevant means test had modest monetary benefits, 
and all New Zealand residents normally had access to medical, hospital 
and other related benefits under Part 2 of the Act (Fahy 1982).
2. The Woodhouse Report characterized the adversarial fault system as 
being cumbersome, erratic, and extravagant in operation. The negligence 
action was labeled a lottery producing an adequate indemnity for only a 
relatively small group of injured persons.
3. Prior to the revisions effective in the Accident Compensation Act 
1982, the Earners' Fund was charged with all amounts on claims where 
workers suffered injury in motor vehicle accidents in New Zealand aris 
ing out of and in the course of the injured person's employment. Now all 
compensation resulting from motor vehicle accidents is financed through 
levies on vehicle owners.
4. New Zealand dollars are reported. The NZ/US exchange rate was ap 
proximately $.64 (NZ) per $1.00 (US) as of April 1984.
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5. For the individual, the legislation stipulates that the earnings related 
compensation for all periods of incapacity extending beyond the first 
week is calculated by reference to the amount of "relevant earnings" 
(ACA & 104). In December 1978, the limit on relevant earnings deter 
mined under S. 104 was removed, however. Instead a limit was placed on 
the amount of weekly compensation paid. In December 1981, the max 
imum amount of earnings-related compensation was increased from 
$288 per week to $600 per week. The ACC may at its discretion fix a 
minimum amount of earnings for the self-employed, and for the period 
March 1983 to March 1984 this minimum was set at $12,324 or 
$2377week. Earnings-related compensation may in general be paid until 
a claimant reaches the age of 65 years, but where the injured earner is 
over 60 special provisions apply.
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